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The Contrasting Role of Higher Order Awareness in 
Hypnosis and Meditation
Rebecca Semmens-Wheeler, MSc *, †; Zoltan Dienes, PhD*
Meditation and hypnosis might be regarded as involving similar processes and skills. For example, 
both meditation and hypnosis are associated with high levels of absorption and imaginative capac-
ity, and both can be used for self-regulation.  Research has also shown that meditation improves 
attentional functioning, and that hypnotic response can involve attentional strategies. However, 
we argue that hypnosis and mindfulness meditation are essentially different.  Crucially, hypnotic 
experience results from a lack of awareness of mental states (specifically, of intentions); by contrast, 
mindfulness meditation aims to develop accurate meta-awareness. Hypnosis is a form of self de-
ception; meditation a way of getting to know your mind. We discuss the empirical relation of both 
meditation and hypnosis to higher order awareness of mental states, and suggest further research. 
Introduction
Comparisons are frequently made between 
hypnosis and meditation (e.g. Delmonte, 1984; 
Holroyd, 2003; Van Nuys, 1973; Yapko, 2011). Both 
typically involve some physical relaxation, for 
example; however deep relaxation is not a neces-
sary nor even a necessarily helpful component of 
either (e.g. Banyai and Hilgard, 1976; Hanh and 
Nquyen, 2006). So care is needed to disentangle 
contingent similarities from core ones, and we 
will attempt in this review to do so. Both hyp-
nosis and meditation are involved in self regu-
lation — but self regulation can be performed in 
different, even opposing, ways. In this review, we 
highlight similarities and differences between 
meditation and hypnosis, arguing that they are es-
sentially different. First we indicate what is meant 
by hypnosis and meditation. Then we consider 
the relation between the two implied by differ-
ent theories of hypnosis, in terms of the role of 
executive systems (attention and metacognition) 
in hypnosis according to those theories. Next, we 
consider the empirical evidence for the role of at-
tention and metacognition in each of meditation 
and hypnosis. Finally, we consider evidence more 
directly relating meditation and hypnosis. We will 
argue that at their core, meditation and hypnosis 
are opposites.
What is hypnosis?
The word hypnosis can either refer to a state that 
follows a hypnotic induction (cf. Barnier and 
Nash 2008); or else to the suggested distortions of 
perception or sense of involuntariness that some 
people can create according to the requirements 
of the situation (e.g. Dienes, 2012).  In the first 
sense, hypnosis is a state, a way of being; in the 
second, it is a way of doing (responding to sug-
gestions). Hypnosis as a state could be just a par-
ticular pattern of phenomenology (attention ab-
sorbed inwards or outwards, time going faster or 
slower, self talk increased or decreased, and so on; 
see e.g. Pekala and Kumar, 2007), or, in addition, 
according to some theories, a global change in 
how information is processed that causally affects 
response to suggestions (e.g. impairment of the 
executive system; Jamieson and Woody, 2007). 
Responding hypnotically involves a specific mo-
tor or cognitive action accompanied by an altered 
sense of volition or reality. For example, a person 
can hold their hands out, imagine they are mag-
nets and feel their hands move together seem-
ingly by themselves. The act of the hands moving 
together is mundane; what makes it hypnotic is 
the sense that it happens by itself. Or a person 
can, on request, change the color of an object 
from say red to green, with the hallucinated color 
seeming external and real. Imagining an object in 
a counterfactual color is mundane; what makes 
the cognitive act hypnotic is the sense of reality 
that accompanies the act of imagination. These 
acts constitute hypnotic responding whether or 
not the person is in a hypnotic state.  It is im-
portant to bear the distinction between acts and 
states in mind in comparing hypnosis to medi-
tation:  Putative hypnotic and meditative states 
can be compared; or else hypnotic and meditative 
actions can be compared. Nonetheless, the two 
uses are related. For example, on “state” theories 
of hypnosis, if an induced state did not increase 
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response to hypnotic suggestion even slightly, the 
state would not be a hypnotic state.  Conversely, 
on “non-state theories” of hypnosis, the state is it-
self just a response to a suggestion (to experience 
that state, however it is conceived by the subject). 
Researchers have not settled on a consistent use 
of the word ‘hypnosis’ (Kirsch et al, 2011) and the 
word ‘meditation’ can also be used to encom-
pass a wide range of practices (Lutz, Dunne and 
Davidson, 2007).  
 Typically, hypnotic suggestibility is measured 
by giving subjects a hypnotic induction then giv-
ing a series of suggestions. The more suggestions 
a person passes, the more hypnotizable they are. 
Several predictors of hypnotizability have been 
found, including response expectancy (Kirsch 
and Braffman, 1999; Raz, 2006), absorption 
(Wilson and Barber, 1983; Tellegen and Atkinson, 
1974), fantasy proneness (Wilson and Barber, 
1982) and imaginative involvement (Spanos and 
Barber, 1974). While significant correlations have 
been found, they are often only moderate, with 
reliable correlations between hypnosis and ab-
sorption typically around 0.2–0.3 (Kihlstrom, 
2003), for example, and are often smaller when 
hypnotizabilty and putative correlates are tested 
in a different context (e.g. Council, Kirsch and 
Hafner, 1986, but see Nadon, Hoyt, Register and 
Kihlstrom, 1991). The most reliable and replicable 
correlate of suggestibility after an induction is 
responding to suggestions without being given a 
hypnotic induction (around 0.7, e.g. Hilgard and 
Tart, 1966; Braffman, and Kirsch, 1999). 
Thus, hypnotic responding can be distin-
guished from a special altered state of hypnosis 
(see Raz, 2011, for discussion). Although some 
researchers do claim that hypnosis is a state (e.g. 
Crawford, 1994), there is no established theory 
of a hypnotic state or states.  For example, while 
hypnotic induction has the potential to slightly 
enhance hypnotic suggestibility and produce a 
stronger neural response than without an induc-
tion (Derbyshire, Whalley and Oakley, 2009)*, an 
induction is not necessary for highs to success-
fully respond to hypnotic suggestions (Kirsch 
and Braffman, 2001).  Raz et al (2006) found 
that although highs were able to reduce Stroop 
interference following hypnotic suggestion for 
printed words to become meaningless, a hypnotic 
induction made no real difference to the effect. 
McGeown et al (2012) found that highs were able 
to successfully drain or add color from a colored 
or grayscale stimulus with and without hypnotic 
induction, whereas lows were unable to perform 
the suggestion in either condition. Subjective rat-
ings of hypnotic depth correlated with activation 
in the color processing region (i.e. left fusiform) 
in the color adding condition and in frontal and 
parietal regions (associated with recruitment of 
attentional resources) in the draining condition. 
However, the enhancement seen following hyp-
notic induction was slight, and highs were able to 
effectively perform the suggestion even without 
any hypnotic induction or feeling that they were 
in any way in a hypnotic state. In sum, there is a 
hypnotic way of acting (acting cognitively or be-
haviorally such that the sense of reality or volition 
is distorted according to task requirements) that 
can occur either in or out of a hypnotic state.
What is meditation?
Meditation can be described as a complex fam-
ily of training practices in attention, emotional 
regulation (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne and Davidson, 
2008) and metacognitive awareness (Thompson, 
2006), which (aim to) contribute to the develop-
ment of a more veridical experience of the world. 
Meditation practice in the shorter term, in partic-
ular mindfulness-based training, is also used (as 
hypnosis is) for the treatment of stress (Fletcher 
et al, 1995), depression (Ramel, Goldin, Carmona 
and McQuaid 2004; Teasdale et al, 2000), addic-
tion (Bowen et al, 2006) and pain management 
(Kabat-Zinn, Davidson and Houshmand, 1985). 
Just as hypnotic responding can be distinguished 
from a hypnotic state, meditative (mindful) ac-
tivity might be viewed as distinct from a medita-
tive state. Such mindful activities can be every-
day occurrences, so long as one is fully present 
and aware of the sensations of the action. For 
example walking, making tea, eating a raisin or 
cleaning one’s teeth can be performed mindfully. 
(Mindfully eating a raisin in an exercise in mind-
fulness based stress reduction courses; Kabat-
Zinn, Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2002.)
It is important to distinguish between the 
various styles of meditation, particularly as some 
of the terms used in modern psychology and 
neuroscience are the same as those translated 
from Buddhist texts, but refer to different con-
structs (Lutz et al, 2007). There is no single clear 
and simple definition of meditation as there are 
many types from different traditions (including 
those from different religions, as well as within 
Buddhism). However, Lutz et al (2007) have 
drawn out some fundamental assumptions that 
can be made about meditation as a whole. First 
of all, meditation practices must be learned. They 
are designed to inhibit undesirable traits (e.g. 
negative cognitive or emotional patterns) and 
enhance or cultivate desirable ones (e.g. non-
reactivity). Many meditation practices achieve 
these by focusing on an aspect of one’s experi-
ence, commonly the breath. Other practices in-
volve developing an open and non-judgmental 
 
* Although note recent 
as yet unpublished data 
from the same lab found a 
stronger neural response 
for suggestion without an 
induction rather than with 
it, Derbyshire, personal 
communication, 6 June 2012
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awareness of one’s emotions and cognitions 
and/or cultivating particular thoughts of feel-
ings, such as those of compassion.  Following 
on from this, it can be predicted that meditation 
will produce specific states. Indeed, evidence 
has shown that compassion meditation leads 
to improvements in affective regulation (Lutz, 
Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone and Davidson, 
2008) and other studies have demonstrated supe-
rior attentional performance in meditators than 
controls and novice meditators (e.g. Moore and 
Malinowski, 2009; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; Slagter, 
Lutz, Geichar, Francis, Nieuwenhuis, Davis and 
Davidson, 2007). Another feature of medita-
tion practice is that improvements can be seen 
over time and are reflected in changes in the 
brain. For example, structural differences have 
been seen in experienced meditators, who had 
greater cortical thickness in the right anterior 
insula (associated with interoception; Critchley, 
Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman and Dolan, 2004, in-
tegration of cognition and emotion and adaptive 
decision-making, Damasio, 1996) than controls 
(Lazar, Kerr, Wasserman, Gray, Greve, Treadway, 
et al 2005). Crucially, cortical thickness in the 
insular cortex was correlated with cumulative 
meditation experience. Practice effects can be 
also seen in the aforementioned improved at-
tentional performance of experienced medita-
tors. Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, Schaefer, Levinson 
and Davidson (2007) reported greater activation 
in the insula and in frontal parietal regions dur-
ing concentration meditation. These areas are 
involved in sustained attention and monitoring 
and making attentional adjustments (Vincent, 
Kahn, Snyder, Raichle and Buckne, 2006; Eckert, 
Menon, Walczak, Ahlstrom, Denslow, Horwitz 
and Dubno, 2009). In meditation such monitor-
ing is used to detect and signal mental drowsi-
ness or over-excitability, which lead to a loss of 
concentration.
For the purposes of investigation and com-
parison of meditation types, three main catego-
ries have been described by Lutz et al, drawing on 
practices within the Buddhist traditions (2007; 
2008; see Box 1). One prevalent meditation tech-
nique, which is used across Buddhist and other 
religious or spiritual traditions is focusing one’s 
attention on the breath.  This practice initially in-
volves focusing on the breath to develop śamatha 
(concentration/sustained attention and resil-
ience to distracting thoughts and emotions) and 
vipaśyanā, which refers to the clarity of perceiv-
ing the nature of that which is being attended. 
Śamatha may be practiced with a range of at-
tentional objects other than the breath (shapes, 
colours, body parts, etc) in order to develop a 
calm sustained attention. Similarly, vipaśyanā in-
volves a range of practices to see how phenomena 
(including mental states) come and go, and how 
certain ones tend to lead to certain others.  The 
practitioner, through continually checking where 
the mind is focused (self-monitoring), begins to 
develop samprajanya, which can be translated 
as meta-awareness (Lutz, Dunne and Davidson, 
2007) or ‘clear knowing’ (Anālayo, 2010). Meta-
awareness, and specifically mindfulness, is a 
common component across all different medi-
tation styles. Mindfulness can be defined as the 
practice of bringing awareness to the present mo-
ment with non-judgmental acceptance (Brown 
and Ryan, 2003). In sum, meditation fundamen-
tally involves the development of attentional and 
metacognitive processes.  Intriguingly, such pro-
cesses have also been fundamental to the main 
theories of hypnosis.
Theoretical relation of hyp-
nosis to meditation
Theories of hypnosis can be classified according 
to the role of executive system in hypnosis, i.e. 
with that system responsible for metacognition 
Visualization practices are also 
used to cultivate desired qualities 
and fall partially into the category of 
FA meditation, yet they go beyond 
concentration on a simple object. 
This is commonly done through use 
of sādhana, which is meditation on 
a text describing various features 
(shape, insignia, color and other at-
tributes) of a Buddha (enlightened 
being) or Bodhisattva (a person who 
is on the brink of enlightenment but 
who holds back out of compassion 
for all beings). The aim of sādhana 
practice is to create single-pointed, 
undistracted focus of the mind on 
the qualities of this being in order to 
cultivate them in oneself (Sangharak-
shita, 2001). 
Other practices involve using what 
are known as supports to concentra-
tion (kammathanas), which include 
the four brahma-viharas, meditation 
on the decomposition of a corpse and 
the Ten Impurities (various disgust-
ing aspects of bodily experience). 
These practices are designed not only 
to develop one-pointed concentra-
tion, but also to relinquish attachment 
to the body by realizing its transitory, 
impermanent nature (Sangharakshi-
ta, 2001) and by breaking down the 
illusion of separate selfhood, with the 
aim of promoting greater compassion 
and non-attachment.
The different meditation styles can 
be categorized as: ‘focused attention’ 
(FA); ‘open monitoring’ (OM) and 
non referential compassion medi-
tation.  These different meditation 
styles have overlapping effects, but do 
recruit different regions of the brain 
(Lutz et al, 2007). 
FA meditation tends to practiced in 
stages beginning with breath count-
ing and progressing to focus on the 
point of entry of the breath into the 
body, for example. OM meditation, 
also known as ‘open presence’ or ‘just 
sitting’ emphasizes the development 
of meta-awareness, where there is 
no such thing as distraction but all 
experience is part of the meditation 
and the goal is to neither avert nor 
attach one’s mind to any experience 
in particular but to become more fa-
miliar with one’s mental tendencies 
and habits. The third style is referred 
to by Lutz et al as non referential com-
passion. However, this is a narrow 
term for what is a set of meditations 
called the ‘Brahma viharas’ (Sanskrit 
for ‘divine abodes’), which essentially 
aim to develop greater awareness of 
emotions and to cultivate an attitude 
of mettā (loving-kindness); karuna 
(compassion); mudita (sympathetic 
joy) and upekha (equanimity). 
Box 1. Meditation styles
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and attentional regulation. Metacognition refers 
to processes that monitor or control thoughts and 
attention (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner, 
2000): Cognition about cognition (see Box 2). 
Some theories of hypnosis postulate a disturbance 
in executive systems, others an enhancement. 
Given that meditation involves special attentional 
and metacognitive abilities, theories of hypnosis 
that postulate impaired attentional or metacogni-
tive processing suggest hypnosis is the opposite 
from meditation. Theories that postulate that 
hypnosis involves no special attentional or meta-
cogntiive abilities suggest hypnosis is orthogonal 
to meditation. Finally, overlap is suggested by the-
ories that postulate hypnosis also involves special 
attentional abilities.
Several theories have explained hypnosis in 
terms of a deficit in frontal lobe executive func-
tion. According to Hilgard’s neo-dissociation the-
ory (1977) the ‘executive ego’ is split in two con-
scious streams, one which controls the hypnotic 
responses, and the other which is unaware of this 
control. In dissociated control theory (Woody and 
Bowers, 1994) hypnosis is described as a weaken-
ing of frontal lobe function so that the supervi-
sory attentional system (i.e. executive system, 
Norman and Shallice, 1986) is rendered  unable 
to control behavior, which is thus controlled by 
the contention scheduling or habit system (hence 
the feeling of involuntariness). Hence, behav-
ior is directly triggered by hypnotic suggestion. 
Gruzelier’s (1998) neurophysiological theory also 
explains hypnosis in terms of diminished atten-
tional abilities.  The purported greater attentional 
abilities of highs leads to a highly concentrated 
state, which causes exhaustion of the frontal lobes 
and thus leads to inhibition of executive frontal 
functioning that contributes toward hypnotic 
response and experience. These theories imply 
hypnosis is not conducive to mindfulness; re-
sponding hypnotically essentially involves a lack 
of mindfulness.
Socio-cognitive theories (e.g. Sarbin and Coe, 
1972; Spanos, 1986, 1991) do not postulate any 
deficit in attention regulation; in fact, hypnotic 
responses are explained in terms of attentional 
and other strategies (for example, hypnotic pain 
relief may be produced partly by distraction). By 
the same token, above-average attentional abili-
ties are not used to explain hypnotic response 
either;  hypnotic behavior is seen as being fun-
damentally similar to other more mundane 
forms of social behavior, with anyone capable of 
producing hypnotic responses if they have the 
right expectations, beliefs, purposes, and attri-
butions. Although hypnosis may involve neither 
enhanced nor diminished attentional abilities on 
this account, it does involve an attributional er-
ror, a failure of metacognition, in attributing one’s 
actions not to oneself but to the hypnotist or a 
special hypnotic state. Once again, these theories 
postulate an inherent contradiction between re-
sponding hypnotically and being mindful.
 In contrast to the above accounts, Crawford 
(1994) suggests that highs are able to respond 
hypnotically due to their superior sustained at-
tentional abilities.  Relatedly, James Braid, the 
person who coined the term hypnosis, claimed 
that successful hypnotic response occurs because 
highs maintain a persistent uncontradicted im-
age of the required result (a theory revived by 
Baars, 1988). According to this theory, hypnotic 
response involves especially good attentional and 
inhibitory abilities. Actions happen automatically 
by sustained thoughts about the actions, and there 
is no inherent contradiction with mindfulness.
In sum, theoretically, the role of attentional 
ability in producing hypnotic response is contro-
versial. We will consider the actual evidence for a 
One of the aims of meditation is to 
increase metacognitive insight so 
that one begins more and more to 
experience thoughts as just thoughts 
rather than thinking about them as 
facts that accurately reflect reality. 
This should, in theory, allow one to 
have a more veridical experience of 
the world through overcoming the 
delusion of thoughts as facts. For ex-
ample, a thought that one is a failure 
and worthless could have an associ-
ated metacognitive insight that this 
belief is not factual. This is precisely 
how mindfulness meditation is used 
to help individuals overcome depres-
sion. 
In the context of hypnosis, many 
theories of hypnosis can be construed 
as metacognitive, that is, theories 
about the way object-level processes 
can be monitored and controlled by 
meta-level processes. For example 
in Hilgard’s (1977) neo-dissociation 
theory, both control and monitor-
ing processes were important in a 
uniquely hypnotic way, with either 
control or monitoring fractionated 
(see also Woody and Sadler, 2008). 
Similarly, Spanos’ (1986) sociocog-
nitive theory construed hypnosis as 
an error in monitoring (attributing 
the causes of our actions to hypnosis 
rather than our intentions) (cf Lynn 
et al 2008). Similarly, cold control 
theory pinpoints hypnotic response 
as caused by a specific metacognitive 
process: Thinking one does not have 
an intention when one does.
Metacognition is most broadly con-
strued as cognition about cognition 
and encompasses monitoring and 
control processes (see Beran et al, 
2012, for an overview of current de-
bates). Nelson and Narens (1990) 
described a conceptual framework 
that has been influential for thinking 
about metacognition. Cognitive pro-
cesses can be divided into object-level 
and meta-level. Object-level process-
es are basic cognitive processes such 
as perception, encoding or retrieval. 
Meta-processes monitor object-level 
processes and control them. For ex-
ample, when given a memory task, 
a “feeling of knowing” is a type of 
metacognitive monitoring that may 
lead to initiating search processes 
(metacognitive control). Metacogni-
tive monitoring is constituted both 
by non-conceptual affective signals, 
such as feelings of knowing (consider 
‘tip of the tongue’ states), as well as by 
conceptual theories concerning how 
one’s mind works (cf Koriat, 2007).   
Meditation can be seen as a process 
of cultivating both metacognitive 
monitoring and control (e.g. sustain-
ing attention, eliminating certain 
sorts of thoughts). Teasdale (1999) 
distinguished between metacogni-
tive knowledge and metacognitive 
insight. For example, we may “know” 
that we are one day going to die and 
we will cease to have a point of view 
(metacognitive knowledge) yet we 
probably do not have a felt sense 
of this fact (metacognitive insight). 
Box 2. Metacognition
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role of attention in hypnotic response below.  But 
a theme common to some of the theories is that 
hypnosis involves a failure of metacognition. In 
Hilgard’s (1977) dissociation theory and also in 
Spanos’ (1986) socio-cognitive theories, subjects 
intend to perform various actions without being 
aware of the intention. That is, hypnosis is essen-
tially a form of self deception. This idea was taken 
up by Dienes and Perner (2007) as a suggestion 
for the simplest theory that might explain hypno-
sis :  Hypnotic response consists of nothing more 
nor less than intending to perform some motor or 
cognitive act while thinking one is not intending 
the action* (see Box 4). The Dienes and Perner 
account draws on Rosenthal’s (2004) higher or-
der thought (HOT) theory of conscious aware-
ness (see Box 3). HOT theory claims that a men-
tal state is a conscious mental state when we are 
conscious of being in that mental state, i.e. when 
we have a higher order thought about being in 
the state. Thus, hypnosis involves having uncon-
scious intentions. The subject exerts intentional 
control without having accurate HOTs about 
those intentions; thus hypnosis is constituted by 
“cold control”. Hypnosis is a purely meta-cog-
nitive phenomenon in which inaccurate higher 
order thought is produced (Dienes, 2012), a stra-
tegic failure of metacognition.  In sum, in terms 
of metacognition, theories have either postulated 
hypnosis involves an impairment of metacogni-
tion (e.g. Dienes and Perner, 2007; Hilagrd, 1977; 
Spanos, 1986), or postulate no special relation 
of hypnotic responding to metacognition (e.g. 
Baars, 1988). We now consider the actual evi-
dence for the relation between each of meditation 
and hypnosis and attention and metacognition.
Attention in hypnosis and 
meditation
Both meditation and hypnosis have been claimed 
to involve enhanced attentional skill, particu-
larly in sustained attention (e.g. Ås, 1963; Buttle, 
2011; Davidson and Goleman, 1977; Gruzelier, 
1998; Karlin, 1979; Lutz, Slagter and Dunne, 2008; 
Raz, 2005; Slagter et al, 2007, 2009; Tang, Ma, 
Wang, Fan, Feng, Yu, et al, 2007; Valentine and 
Sweet, 1999).  Recent research has shown that 
attentional skills can be trained by meditation 
practice (see Lutz et al, 2008 and Austin, 2006, 
for reviews.) The relation of attentional skill to 
hypnosis is more controversial (e.g. Dienes et al 
2009; Jamieson and Sheehan, 2002). We consider 
meditation and hypnosis in turn. 
Meditation can be narrowly viewed as a 
form of attention training (Bishop et al, 2006). 
Lutz et al (2009) found that intensive medita-
tion enhanced attentional stability. Meditators 
were compared before and after a three month 
intensive meditation retreat, during which they 
practiced open monitoring, focused attention 
and loving kindness meditation for 10–12 hours 
 
* It is not merely the absence 
of accurate HOTs that make 
an intentional action hyp-
notic, but the presence of 
the inaccurate HOT that one 
is not intending the action 
(Dienes, 2012). If it were 
just the absence of HOTs of 
intending, then every absent 
minded performance of an 
intentional action would 
count as hypnotic, and a 
creature, perhaps a dog, not 
capable of HOTs of inten-
tion would be permanently 
responding hypnotically!  
If inaccurate HOTs are 
required, it is only an animal 
which possesses mental state 
concepts of intention that 
could in principle respond 
hypnotically (by believing 
they did not intend the 
action).
a ball in front of me” is a first order state: 
Its content is just about the world. It is 
only by virtue of a second order thought 
such as thinking “I see that there is a ball 
in front of me” that we are conscious of 
the first order mental state of seeing and 
seeing then becomes a conscious mental 
state. 
A second order thought becomes con-
scious by virtue of a third order thought; 
for example, it is by thinking “I am aware 
that I am seeing that there is a ball in front 
of me” that one becomes consciously 
aware of seeing the ball. With second 
order thoughts we become conscious of 
According to HOT theory, a mental state 
is a conscious mental state when we are 
conscious of being in that mental state 
(Rosenthal, 1986, 2002).  To be conscious 
of anything being present, for example, a 
ball in front of you, you need to be in a 
mental state representing that “there is 
a ball in front of me”. To be conscious of 
seeing a ball in front of you, therefore you 
need to be in a mental state representing “I 
see a ball in front of me”. That is, you need 
to be in a mental state about a mental state: 
A higher order state. The thought assert-
ing that “I am seeing a ball in front of me” 
is a higher order thought. Seeing “there is 
Box 3. Higher order thoughts 
mental states; with third order thoughts 
we become consciously aware of mental 
states, i.e. we introspect (Rosenthal, 2002). 
Higher order thoughts are metacognitive 
in that they monitor other mental states. 
In fact higher order thought theory pro-
vides one way of defining what “meta” and 
“object” level mean. Object-level process-
es are cognitive processes whose content 
is just about the world. Meta-level pro-
cesses must have content which is at least 
partly about mental states. Higher order 
thoughts are particular metacognitions, 
namely, thoughts asserting that one is in a 
contemporaneous mental state.
While cold control theory sees hyp-
nosis as intrinsically involving self-
deception, such self deception can be 
benign or even useful. Hypnosis in-
volves creating illusions of reality or 
automaticity according to situational 
requirements; that is, hypnotic re-
sponding is “goal directed striving” 
(White, 1942), where the hypnotic 
response is consistent with the over-
all goals and intentions of the subject. 
Thus, hypnosis is like a metacognitive 
game: A meta-cognitive strategy of 
relinquishing metacognition (specifi-
cally accurate concerning a specific 
intention) in order to have the expe-
riences a situation calls for (e.g. pain 
going away by itself as one imagines 
a dial being turned; being possessed 
by a great spirit) (Dienes, 2012). Our 
contrast of hypnosis with meditation 
is not to deny the potential usefulness 
of hypnosis.
Cold control theory (Dienes and Per-
ner, 2007) explains hypnotic respond-
ing as executive control (e.g. intend-
ing to perform a motor or cognitive 
action, e.g. lifting an arm, imagining 
something present) while having in-
accurate higher order thoughts of 
intending (“I am not intending to lift 
my arm/imagine a pink elephant”). 
On this account, a person has no 
first order abilities in responding to a 
hypnotic suggestion that they did not 
have already. The difference between 
a hypnotic and non-hypnotic action 
is that performing the action hypnoti-
cally makes it feel like it is happening 
by itself. For example, an intention to 
lift one’s arm is usually accompanied 
by a higher order thought, e.g. “I am 
intending to lift my arm,” but this is 
not the case in hypnosis, according to 
cold control theory. (It is cold control 
because there is no accurate HOT.)
Box 4. Cold control theory
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per day. Participants in the control condition re-
ceived a one hour meditation training session be-
fore each experimental session and meditated for 
20 minutes per day for one week before each test-
ing session. Both groups were asked to perform 
two versions of a dichotic listening task: the open 
monitoring version, in which they were asked to 
identify deviant tones in both ears, and the fo-
cused attention version, in which they were asked 
to identify a deviant tone in the one attended ear, 
whilst ignoring tones in the other ear. Using EEG, 
they found that meditators showed increased the-
ta-band phase consistency compared to pre-train-
ing and to controls, consistent with sustained at-
tention and on-line cognitive control. Meditators 
also showed reduced variability in neuronal pro-
cessing regardless of whether or not the tone was 
deviant, in line with claims that focused attention 
meditation develops the monitoring faculty, and 
so one remains vigilant to distractions while re-
taining a stable focus, as well as enhanced ability 
to disengage from distraction. Slagter et al (2007) 
found that participants in one study using an at-
tentional blink paradigm demonstrated similar 
detection of T1 (the first target) and increased 
detection of T2 (the second target), compared to 
baseline and controls, following three months of 
intensive meditation training, indicating medita-
tion practice produced a more optimal distribu-
tion of attention.  On the Stroop task, expert med-
itators versus controls showed decreased Stroop 
interference (Moore and Malinowski, 2009; 
Wenk-Sormaz, 2005).  Further, meditators re-
ported higher level of mindfulness (on the KIMS) 
and mindfulness was linked to fewer errors on the 
Stroop task (Moore and Malinowski, 2009)
 The studies to date consistently point in 
the direction of good attentional skills in expert 
rather than novice meditators, though a general 
problem in the field is accounting for motiva-
tional differences between experts and controls. 
When experts know they are selected for the 
study based on being experts, they may work 
harder to meet the demands of the situation, or 
produce expected responses just because they 
are expected (response expectancy; Kirsch, 1985; 
1997). A frequent control in the hypnosis field is 
to select high and low hypnotizables for further 
testing without subjects knowing the basis on 
which they are being selected (Council, Kirsch, 
and Hafner, 1986) but many studies on the ef-
fects of meditation or mindfulness training have 
not taken this into account. A recent study, how-
ever, tried to disentangle motivational effects by 
comparing a control group with other groups that 
received a financial incentive, mindfulness based 
stress reduction training (MBSR) and non-mind-
fulness based stress reduction training (NMSR). 
They found that while some attentional improve-
ments (sustained, visual and temporal attention) 
can be accounted for by an increase in attentional 
effort, only the group who received MBSR train-
ing showed improvements on sustained selective 
attention, suggesting that MBSR training had an 
effect above and beyond motivation and non-spe-
cific stress reduction (Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer 
and Hasselbalch, 2012). 
The above studies compared experts and 
novices in meditation; the comparable studies in 
hypnosis are those comparing high and low hyp-
notizables. Evidence of superior attentional abili-
ties in highs rather than lows is mixed and the 
issue remains unresolved (contrast e.g. Crawford 
et al, 1993 with Dienes et al, 2009). Studies us-
ing the Stroop test have produced conflicting 
findings, with either no significant difference 
between highs and lows or with differences in 
either direction. Without hypnotic induction or 
suggestions being used, most studies have found 
no significant difference between highs and lows 
on Stroop interference (Aikens and Ray 2001; 
Egner et al 2005; Kaiser et al 1997; Kallio et al 
2001). Dixon et al (1990) and Dixon and Laurence 
(1992) found significantly more Stroop interfer-
ence in highs than lows; however,  Rubichi et al 
(2005) found significantly less Stroop interfer-
ence in highs rather than lows.  On a related task 
Iani et al (2006) found that highs and lows with-
out an induction were not detectably different in 
terms of the effect of irrelevant flanking items on 
the classification of a central letter. While proce-
dural differences (e.g. responses given as button 
presses vs. vocalization) may account for the dif-
ferent results, the pattern allows only nuanced 
claims about attention and hypnotizability. A 
component of attention is the ability to inhibit 
irrelevant information. On a negative priming 
task, in which participants are instructed to at-
tend to some stimuli and ignore others, Dienes et 
al (2009) found with 180 participants the correla-
tions between hypnotizability and negative prim-
ing or between hypnotizability and latent inhibi-
tion were close to zero, with upper limits of about 
0.20. Similarly, Varga et al (2011) with 116 subjects 
found no significant correlations between hypno-
tizability and reaction time measures of sustained, 
selective, divided or executive attention. In sum, 
the consistent findings that expert meditators are 
superior to novices in attention are not in general 
matched by evidence for highly hypnotizables be-
ing better at attention tasks than lows.
While highs do not seem especially good at 
attentional tasks when asked to simply perform 
them, when they are given a relevant strategy, 
they can outperform lows whether or not they 
had been given a hypnotic induction (Raz et al, 
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2006). Specifically, when highs are given the sug-
gestion that words will appear to them as mean-
ingless, the Stroop effect can be substantially re-
duced (e.g. Parris, Dienes, and Hodgson, in press; 
Raz et al 2002; Raz et al 2003; see also Iani et al 
2006). Similarly, Iani, Ricci Baroni and Rubichi 
(2009) found that hypnotic suggestion reduced 
interference from irrelevant spatial stimuli in 
highs, but not lows in a Simon-like (spatial in-
terference) task. The suggestion that reduces the 
Stroop effect has been shown to be just as effec-
tive whether or not a hypnotic induction is given 
(Raz et al 2006; contrast Iani et al 2006), so ap-
pears not to depend on being in a special state, 
but on having a certain ability. The effect appears 
non-existent to weak in lows (Parris and Dienes, 
submitted; Raz and Campbell 2011). Thus, para-
doxically, asking highs to be less mindful (i.e. to 
act hypnotically) enables them to perform better 
on the same attention tasks (Stroop) that medita-
tors appear to improve upon by meditation train-
ing. We do not have a resolution to the paradox 
that both being more mindful (meditation) and 
less mindful (hypnosis) improves Stroop, but it is 
a problem on which we are currently working.
In terms of what happens to attentional abil-
ity after a hypnotic induction, Gruzelier and 
Warren (1993) found that highs performed worse 
on letter fluency (particularly associated with 
activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; 
DLPFC) and finger tapping dexterity but im-
proved on design fluency (a measure of planning 
and cognitive flexibility) following a hypnotic 
induction. The reduction in performance on the 
letter fluency task was replicated by Kallio et al 
(2001) and Wagstaff, Cole and Brunas-Wagstaff 
(2007). However, Wagstaff et al also found that 
subjects who reported greater hypnotic depth 
(strongly correlated with hypnotic suggestibility) 
demonstrated better performance on a phonemic 
fluency test during hypnosis than during the non-
hypnotic condition.  Egner et al (2005) found evi-
dence using neuroimaging techniques that there 
is a dissociation of frontal executive and conflict 
monitoring systems. They used EEG to examine 
functional connectivity and event-related fMRI 
to image highs and lows while they performed 
on a task measuring attentional conflict resolu-
tion (the Stroop task) following a hypnotic in-
duction.  There was an increase in gamma band 
coherence (associated with concerted attentional 
focus) in lows and a decrease in highs, along with 
an increase in ACC activation, consistent with 
poorer efficiency of conflict monitoring in highs 
(although no difference in Stroop performance 
was observed).  The (albeit checkered) evidence 
for a general reduction in attentional functioning 
after hypnotic induction contrasts to claims about 
meditation (though little research has tested 
people in versus out of a “meditative state”). It 
may be that the act of producing feelings of an 
altered state takes up capacity, and thus leaves less 
capacity for other tasks.
One interesting marker of attention to task 
is activity in the default mode network (DMN). 
The DMN is associated with mind-wandering 
and self-referential thought and reduced acti-
vation is usually seen when focusing or paying 
attention during goal-directed and externally 
oriented tasks (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, 
Smith and Schooler 2009; Uddin, Kelly, Biswal, 
Xavier Castellanos, and Milham, 2009). Further, 
activity tends to be lower during high rather 
than low cognitive load (Uddin et al, 2009). 
Consistent with the claim that an induction en-
courages highs to pay attention to the hypnotist 
and/or specific strategies, McGeown et al (2009) 
found activity in the anterior DMN (ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex and DLPFC) was reduced 
following hypnotic induction during rest periods 
between suggestions in highs. Lows, on the other 
hand, showed reduced activity in areas related to 
alertness, probably in response to the relaxation 
induction used.  Deeley et al (2012) conducted a 
similar study, scanning participants during pas-
sive viewing condition, however no suggestions 
were provided. Reduced activity was seen in the 
DMN and anterior cingulate cortex and increased 
activity in prefrontal attentional systems after 
hypnotic induction, compared to pre-induction. 
Furthermore, participants reported greater lev-
els of self-reported attentional absorption, which 
was inversely related to activity in the DMN. The 
results of McGeown et al and Deeley et al support 
the notion that an induction informs subjects to 
pay attention to whatever strategies are needed to 
maintain a feeling of being hypnotized.   
A number of studies have also shown de-
creased activation in the DMN in meditators dur-
ing concentration (FA), mettā bhavana (loving 
kindness) and choiceless awareness (OM) medi-
tation, compared to non-meditators (Brewer et al, 
2011). This may reflect high cognitive load in these 
styles of meditation. In support of this conjecture, 
another study that investigated activity in the 
DMN in meditators gained the opposite results: 
greater activation in mid frontal brain regions 
overlapping the DMN during meditation practice 
(Travis et al, 2009).  Participants were perform-
ing transcendental meditation (TM), which is re-
ported to be a simple, easy and non-demanding 
task. Thus, work on DMN activity has shown that 
hypnosis and meditation generally involve acts of 
paying attention, but this is consistent with medi-
tation, which is explicitly associated with mental 
training, involving especially good attentional 
abilities and hypnotic responsiveness requiring 
only average attentional abilities. 
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In sum, both hypnosis and meditation involve 
paying attention, but whereas experienced medi-
tators have better attentional skills than novices, 
hypnotizability appears unrelated to attentional 
skill, and the induction of a hypnotic state may 
even be associated with impoverished attentional 
skills (though contrast Iani et al, 2006). 
Meta-awareness and the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex 
A fundamental difference between hypnotic sug-
gestion and meditation is that hypnosis often 
involves an altered or distorted experience of 
reality. The purpose of meditation for long-term 
practitioners, on the other hand, is to stimulate 
change and development towards seeing reality 
more clearly (Kamalashila, 1992), partly by devel-
oping meta-awareness, or accurate higher order 
thoughts (HOTs). 
Accurate HOTs, i.e. awareness of mental 
states, has been linked to the dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex (DLPFC) (Lau and Passingham, 2006). 
Lau and Passingham found two masking condi-
tions in which people could discriminate one of 
two shapes to an equal degree but differed in the 
extent to which they were aware of seeing the 
shapes rather than just guessing about them. That 
is, the DLPFC was not linked to the first order 
mental state of seeing, but to awareness of seeing. 
Further, when Rounis et al (2010) disrupted the 
area with theta burst TMS, subjects’ self-reported 
awareness of seeing was disrupted even when first 
order perception was titrated to be the same with 
and without TMS. That is, the disruption Rounis 
et al found was purely related to HOTs.  We might 
expect to see differences between highly hypno-
tizables and meditators in the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPFC). Specifically, we might 
expect less activation in highs and greater activa-
tion in meditators.
If the DLPFC is responsible for accurate 
higher order thoughts in general, disrupting the 
region with rTMS or alcohol should make it hard-
er to be aware of intending to perform an action. 
Given that people who are highly hypnotizable 
seem to have less accurate HOTs, disrupting the 
function of the DLPFC should make it easier to 
subjectively respond to a hypnotic suggestion (ac-
cording to cold control theory)*. 
Dienes and Hutton (submitted) tested this 
with TMS. Subjects gave ratings on a 0–5 scale 
of the extent to which they experienced the re-
sponse, for four suggestions (magnetic hands, 
arm levitation, rigid arm and taste hallucination). 
Overall, rTMS to the DLPFC rather than vertex 
increased degree of hypnotic response by about 
a third of a rating point on average. Further, 
subjects did not differ in their expectancy that 
they would respond in the two conditions, so the 
rTMS had an effect on hypnotic experience above 
and beyond expectancies. A further study con-
ceptually replicated the effect, but this time using 
alcohol, which has been shown to particularly af-
fect the DLPFC (Wendt and Risberg, 2001). We 
recently explored the effect of alcohol on hyp-
notic response with Theodora Duka at Sussex 
University. Medium hypnotizables were assigned 
to either an alcohol or placebo alcohol condition 
and were then tested on nine suggestions and 
various frontal tasks. Alcohol indeed disrupted 
frontal function and crucially, alcohol increased 
hypnotic response by one scale unit compared 
to placebo, on the same scale as used in the TMS 
study. Although both the TMS and alcohol would 
have affected regions of the brain outside the 
DLPFC, the evidence is consistent with cold con-
trol, hypnosis as self deception. The evidence is 
also consistent with other theories that postulate 
hypnosis involves diminished executive control 
(Woody and Bowers, 1994) or metacognitive con-
trol (Jamieson and Woody, 2007). Either way, the 
increase of hypnotizability following disruption 
of the dlPFC supports the distinction between 
hypnosis and meditation, during which increased 
activation is seen in the DLPFC.
In contrast to findings in hypnosis literature, 
several studies have shown increased activation 
in the DLPFC, among other areas, in meditation 
practitioners during and after meditation prac-
tice (Brewer et al, 2011; Farb et al, 2007; Kosaza et 
al, 2008; Lazar, 2009). For example, Brefczynski-
Lewis et al (2007) used fMRI to compare experi-
enced and novice meditators and found greater 
activation in the DLPFC. Concordantly, it has 
been claimed that meditators are better at giving 
self-reports than non-meditators (Kabat-Zinn, 
2011). In sum, the differential activation seen 
in the DLPFC during meditation and hypnosis 
seems to support the suggestion that hypnosis 
and meditation differ in metacognitive capa-
bilities subserved by the DLPFC (Dienes, 2012; 
Woody and Sadler, 2008). 
Meditation is hotter than 
hypnosis
One apparent similarity between hypnosis and 
meditation is that both seem to involve absorp-
tion. Like high versus low hypnotizables, expert 
versus novice meditators score more highly on 
absorption as measured by the Tellegen absorp-
tion scale (TAS) (Davidson, 1976). We have 
since replicated this finding in our lab at Sussex 
University (in an as yet unpublished study), and 
found that absorption also correlated positively 
 
* Cold control theory 
makes a more precise set of 
predictions. Namely, if the 
frontal lobes are impaired 
sufficiently that the relevant 
cognitive or motor action 
cannot be performed with 
conscious intentions then 
the same action cannot be 
performed as a hypnotic 
suggestion (Dienes and 
Perner, 2007). However, 
if the impairment allows 
the relevant actions to be 
performed, but is targeted 
to impair HOT accuracy, 
then hypnotic performance 
will be facilitated. Thus far 
at least, in making these pre-
dictions, cold control theory 
has remained one step ahead 
of the data.
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with self-reported mindfulness as measured by 
the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills 
(KIMS; Baer, Smith and Allen, 2004). Although 
the phenomenological states of hypnosis and 
meditative absorptions (dhyanas in Sanskrit) 
appear to be similar in some respects (Holroyd, 
2008), the feeling of absorption involved in both 
hypnotic and meditative states may reflect differ-
ent processes, as we now discuss. 
Although absorption and hypnosis appear 
to be related, we need to take care in our under-
standing of what precisely absorption is. The sub-
jective sense of being absorbed could represent 
four distinct modes of mental processing. Firstly, 
one could be mind wandering without being 
aware that one was doing so, thus one could be-
lieve one was or had been absorbed in the main 
task (c.f. Schooler, 2006). Particularly when en-
gaging in open-ended imaginative activity, such 
mind wandering may not show in any obvious 
way, and indeed may blend with the imaginative 
activity itself. Secondly, there could be thoughts 
distracting the mind, but there is meta-awareness 
of this distraction, allowing disengagement from 
the distraction to take place.  Thirdly, irrelevant 
thoughts may be present, but attention is neither 
attached to nor averted from them; the mind is 
not distracted. Finally, one could actually be sin-
gle-mindedly or one-pointedly thinking about 
the object of thought (see Taylor, 2002). The first 
state of absorption is only apparent absorption; it 
appears to be absorption because of a lack of ac-
curate HOTs (call it cold absorption)   In medi-
tation, one aims to progress through these states, 
becoming aware of the mental chatter that usu-
ally pervades our minds, letting go of thoughts 
and entering the dhyanas (absorptions, in which 
one becomes aware of more subtle thoughts and 
sensations; see Austin, 2006 and Holroyd, 2003 
for more in-depth description). Meditation and 
mindfulness practice involve training in the de-
velopment of second-order awareness (Teasdale, 
1999; Wallace 1999). This could be described as a 
state of absorption that involves meta-awareness 
(Lutz, Dunne and Davidson, 2007) and is a goal 
state of meditation. We could call meditative 
absorption ‘HOT’ absorption (absorption with 
HOTs), reflecting a state of absorbed attention in 
which one remains meta-aware of the contents 
of one’s consciousness as opposed, possibly, to 
hypnotic absorption: ‘cold’ absorption (absorp-
tion without HOTs), in which one has less meta-
awareness of the contents of one’s consciousness 
and thus may more easily create inaccurate HOTs 
about their experience.
We have tested the hypothesis that highs have 
fewer accurate HOTs than meditators and con-
trols at Sussex by asking subjects to keep looking 
at images while trying to either a) remain at all 
times aware of seeing the image (meditation 
task; cf. Van Nuys, 1973) or b) not consciously see 
the image for 15 minutes (ignore task; compare 
Wegner’s, 1994, ‘white bear’ ironic control task, 
where people are asked to not think of a white 
bear). Subjects were asked at random intervals 
(roughly once a minute) whether they were just 
that instant before aware of seeing the image. 
Because people remained physically looking at 
the images there was a persistent first order visual 
representation of each image; but to what extent 
did people have accurate higher order thoughts 
about seeing it? The difference between a) and b) 
in reports of seeing the image was taken as mea-
suring control in having accurate HOTs, and the 
total number of reports of seeing the image in 
both a) and b) as measuring coupling of HOTs to 
first order states, i.e. the tendency to have an ap-
propriate HOT given that a first order state exists. 
We found that highs had poorer HOT coupling 
than lows, i.e. less accurate higher order thoughts 
across both tasks (Dienes, 2012, and Semmens-
Wheeler and Dienes, 2011). This greater propensi-
ty to mind-wander meant highs were marginally 
better at ironic control than lows (and non-signif-
icantly worse at meditation). This apparent weak 
coupling may allow highs to decide in appropri-
ate contexts to forgo higher order thoughts of in-
tending in order to respond hypnotically to sug-
gestions. In contrast, we found that meditators 
were poor at ironic control compared to highs, a 
finding which could be explained by the fact that 
they had significantly more HOTs than both lows 
and highs. (It is intriguing to find meditators bad 
at a mental control task!)  Thus it seems unlikely 
that meditators would experience hypnotic sug-
gestion through a lack of HOT coupling and we 
might even expect that they would not be very 
hypnotizable. 
Consistent with the evidence that highs are 
not absorbed in an undistracted way, hypnotic 
responding itself does not require attending 
“one-pointedly” to one idea. Zamansky and Clark 
(1986) asked subjects to engage in imagery incon-
sistent with the hypnotic suggestions given (e.g. 
for a rigid arm suggestion, to imagine a differ-
ent world in which their arm is bending). Highs 
were just as responsive to suggestions (e.g. that 
the arm is unbendable) when engaged in imagery 
inconsistent with the suggestion as when having 
consistent imagery, even as they concurrently 
reported the imagery. That is, their arm remains 
unbent, even as the subjects described an image 
of the arm bending. Thus, the theory that highs 
attend to one idea in order to achieve hypnotic 
response is false. Hypnotic response will tolerate 
not only mind wandering but also contradictory 
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ideas. By contrast, the absorption in meditation 
can be specifically directed at making the mind 
hold to one idea without distraction.
Shaw (2006 p 98), based on the descriptions 
of meditation in the Pali canon, describes how 
the meditator gradually acquires the feeling of 
control of entering, sustaining and leaving ab-
sorbed states — in contrast to the lack  of control 
a hypnotized subject may feel (indeed, needs to 
feel in some way for a response to be hypnotic). 
In a related way, Gombrich (1996 p 163) empha-
sizes the self control and self awareness cultivated 
in Buddhism as an antithesis to spirit possession. 
Dienes and Perner (2007) identified spirit posses-
sion as the same natural kind as hypnosis (i.e. as a 
case of cold control). 
Mindfulness versus self deception are general 
principles defining the nature of meditation and 
hypnosis in broad brush stroke; of course specific 
hypnotic and meditative experiences may draw 
on the other in detail. For example, vajrayana 
meditation (Gyatso, 2005) involves coming to see 
imagination as reality, but this does not take away 
from the fact that meditation must involve cul-
tivation of mindfulness generally to be Buddhist 
meditation at all. (Even such cultivation will al-
ways leave scope for inaccurate higher order 
thoughts; cf. Shaw, 2006, p 66, points 2, 4, 5, 6, and 
7 for mistaken beliefs the Buddha apparently had 
about his mental states, e.g. recalling past lives.*) 
Just as an episode in a hypnotic context may in-
volve some cognitive activities being consciously 
controlled in a mindful way (Dienes, 2012; Yapko, 
2011) so meditation may involve inaccurate high-
er order thoughts. Nonetheless, if a person were 
aware and mindful of all intentions they would 
have failed to respond hypnotically; and a medi-
tator misrepresenting a mental state would have 
failed to be mindful. Where each succeeds in its 
goals, meditation is hotter than hypnosis.
Directly comparing medita-
tion and hypnosis?
So far we have compared meditation and hypno-
sis indirectly. We will now consider directly the 
relationship between meditation and hypnosis. 
First we consider the correlation between success 
at meditating and responding to hypnosis, then 
whether training can improve meditation and 
hypnosis, and finally the hypnotizability of people 
who meditate extensively. 
Van Nuys (1974; also Spanos, Rivers, and 
Gottlieb, 1978) found that performance on a 
meditation task significantly predicted hypnotiz-
ability. Participants carried out a meditation task, 
which involved participants pressing a button 
whenever they experienced an intruding thought. 
(Note that participants were not probed, but were 
asked to report whenever they noticed thoughts, 
i.e. when they had a HOT.)  Based on our dis-
cussion of hot and cold absorption (i.e. absorbed 
attention with and without meta-awareness, re-
spectively), there is an obvious methodological 
problem with the Van Nuys task. The task may 
not have really been measuring the number of 
intrusive thoughts, but the awareness of such 
thoughts arising.  Thus, another way of interpret-
ing the results could be to say that it was the lack 
of awareness of intrusive thoughts i.e. a lack of 
meta-awareness that predicted hypnotizability 
(see Smallwood and Schooler, 2006 for descrip-
tion of meta-awareness and mind wandering). On 
this account highs may even have more intrusive 
thoughts than lows (as found by Bryant and Idey, 
2001, on a self-report questionnaire).  When we 
determined on-line number of intrusive thoughts 
by probes, as described above (Dienes, 2012, and 
Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes, 2011), allowing 
the measure of intrusive thoughts to be separated 
from meta-awareness (as per the methodology of 
Smallwood and Schooler, 2006), hypnotizability 
was not associated with concentration on the task 
in our data (hypnotizability was non-significantly 
associated with more intrusions, r =  .21, 95% CI 
[-.09, .51], the confidence interval ruling out the 
size of effect Van Nuys obtained, i.e.  r about -.3) 
 Without training, hypnotic suggestibil-
ity is relatively stable, with test-retest correla-
tions ranging from 0.64 to 0.82 (Barnier and 
McConkey, 2004). So far a number of attempts 
have been made to enhance participants’ hypnot-
ic suggestibility, with some success (e.g. Cooper, 
Banford, Schubot, and Tart, 1967; Diamond, 1972; 
Engstrom, Perry and Hart, 1970). Apparently suc-
cessful attempts have involved changing subjects’ 
beliefs, expectations and attitudes to hypnosis in 
a single session (e.g. the Carleton Skills Training 
Package, see Gorassini, 2004; see also Wickless 
and Kirsch, 1989, and contrast Benham, Bowers, 
Nash, and Muenchen, 1998). These training 
schemes contrast dramatically with the extensive 
attentional training required to make progress 
in meditation. Brief meditation training has not 
yet been found to increase hypnotic ability (e.g. 
Heide, Wadlington and Lundy, 1980).  
What is the effect of extensive meditation 
training on hypnotic response? We compared 
scores of twelve expert meditators on the Waterloo 
Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility 
(WGSC; Bowers, 1998) with scores of over 500 
screened participants in the University of Sussex 
database; our preliminary findings show that 
meditators, passing on average 3/12 suggestions, 
were less susceptible than the average of  all 
subjects in the database combined (average 5.5 
 
* Accurate higher order 
thoughts depend as much 
on having a good theory of 
mental states as on cultivat-
ing the process of notic-
ing mental states -  just as 
accurate observation of the 
world depends crucially 
on good theory (consider 
telescopes) (cf Hurlburt and 
Schwitzgebel, 2007, and 
Petitmengin, 2009, for a 
discussion of the capabilities 
and limits of introspection). 
In Bayesian terms, accurate 
beliefs about one’s mental 
states are improved by hav-
ing good priors. Because of 
this, empirical results from 
experimental psychology 
may inform good medita-
tion practice (and vice 
versa).
53 || MBR || Volume : 2 || Issue : 1
ar t ic le The Journal of Mind–Body Regulation
m
br
.s
yn
er
gi
es
pr
ai
ri
es
.c
a
suggestions). Furthermore, in an as yet unpub-
lished study at Sussex we found that highly hyp-
notically suggestible individuals (‘highs’) scored 
significantly lower on measures of mindfulness, 
which is associated with meditation experience 
(Semmens-Wheeler and Erskine, 2009). The cor-
relation between hypnotizability and mindfulness 
was -.38.  The tendency for meditators for be less 
hypnotizable than non-meditators may reflect 
poor attitudes and low expectations on the part of 
meditators about hypnosis; we are directly testing 
this possibility now. We predict that meditators 
will score low on hypnotizability even after con-
trolling for beliefs and expectations, precisely be-
cause they have cultivated having accurate higher 
order thoughts.
Conclusion
There are certainly some areas of overlap between 
meditation and hypnosis, yet this relationship may 
turn out to be orthogonal or opposed, particularly 
with regard to meta-awareness. We have argued 
that the essential nature of hypnotic response, 
that which makes it hypnotic at all, is a strategic 
self deception with respect to ones intentions 
(Dienes, 2012; Hilgard, 1977; Spanos, 1986; Spanos 
and Gorassini, 1999); by contrast, an essential 
component of meditative practice is mindfulness, 
seeing plainly what is there. However, it is im-
portant to take into account response expectancy 
both theoretically and methodologically, as it 
can explain some effects in both meditation and 
hypnosis. For example, if one expects that either 
meditation or hypnosis will impair or enhance 
performance on a particular task, then one is 
likely to conform the this belief (Kirsch, 1997). 
In clinical practice, techniques called hypnotic or 
mindful may overlap (Lynn, Das, Hallquist, and 
Williams, 2006), but we need to be careful which 
specific activities we call hypnotic. Just calling re-
laxation or the use of imagination or a suggestion 
for improvement ‘hypnotic’ does not make it so. 
As we said in the introduction, to turn cognitive 
activities into hypnotic responses, those activities 
must involve distortion in the sense of voluntari-
ness or reality. Further, similar clinical outcomes 
may be produced by opposite strategies, for ex-
ample, analgesia may be produced by seeing pain 
for exactly what the experience is (Salomons and 
Kucyi, 2011), or by using cognitive strategies of 
distraction and reinterpretation (strategies one 
intended without knowing, Dienes, 2012). As 
urged by Lynn et al and Yapko (2011), research 
exploring whether hypnosis and mindfulness are 
useful as complimentary integrated clinical strat-
egies is important. Future studies could explore 
metacognition and cognitive flexibility (e.g. cog-
nitive set-shifting ability) in meditators and high 
hypnotizables and also provide more in-depth 
analysis of phenomenological experience (Pekala, 
1982, 1991). 
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